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Abstract—Numerous IoT applications, like building automa-
tion or process control of industrial sites, exist today. These
applications inherently have a strong connection to the physical
world. Hence, IT security threats cannot only cause problems
like data leaks but also safety issues which might harm people.
Attacks on IT systems are not only performed by outside
attackers but also insiders like administrators. For this reason,
we present ongoing work on a configuration management sys-
tem (CMS) that provides control over administrators, restrains
their rights, and enforces separation of concerns. We reach this
goal by conducting a configuration management process that
requires multi-party authorization for critical configurations to
achieve Byzantine fault tolerance against attacks and faults by
administrators. Only after a configuration has been authorized
by multiple experts, it is applied to the targeted devices. For the
whole configuration management process, our CMS guarantees
accountability and traceability. Lastly, our system is tamper-
resistant as we leverage Hyperledger Fabric, which provides a
distributed execution environment for our CMS and a blockchain-
based distributed ledger that we use to store the configurations.
A beneficial side effect of this approach is that our CMS is
also suitable to manage configurations for infrastructure shared
across different organizations that do not need to trust each other.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) connects devices from small
sensors and actuators to large machines. Home or building
automation, machine monitoring, and process control of
industrial plants are only some IoT application examples [2].
One inherent property of IoT is a strong connection to the
physical world. For this reason, security weaknesses can result
in privacy problems when sensitive data is leaked or persons get
injured if safety mechanisms fail. Consequently, IoT systems
require a high IT security standard whose steady maintenance
is challenging in the age of Advanced Persistent Threats (APT).
APTs often target system administrators directly by attacks
like spear phishing or waterholing [3, p. 37/38]. Consequences
for the whole IoT system are severe, as the attacker can abuse
the conquered administrative rights.
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Another important scenario are administrators that turned evil
and who now abuse their rights, e.g., to steal company secrets
or to harm their employer. Such attacks can be categorized as
insider attacks, which caused 10%-32% of data breaches in
2015 according to different studies [3, p. 53]. Both scenarios
stress the need to defend against attacks that involve abused
administrative rights [4, p. 10]. However, this goal is hard
to achieve, as administrative rights also typically give the
opportunity to tamper or disable many traditional security
solutions, such as security and incident event handling (SIEM),
access control, or logging/auditing systems.
Contributions: In this paper, we present ongoing work
on a configuration management system (CMS) that provides
control over system administrators, restrains their rights, and
helps to enforce separation of concerns. We reach this goal by
conducting a configuration management process that requires
multi-party authorization (MPA) for critical configurations to
achieve Byzantine fault tolerance against attacks and faults by
administrators. Only after a configuration has been reviewed
and authorized by a set of independent experts, the managed
devices retrieve the configuration from our CMS and apply
it locally. The different parties that need to authorize a
configuration can be specified on a per-device basis, making
it possible to take into account the criticality of a device. For
the whole configuration management process of our CMS, we
guarantee accountability and traceability. Lastly, our system
is tamper-resistant as we leverage Hyperledger Fabric, which
provides a distributed execution environment for our CMS and
a blockchain-based distributed ledger to store configurations.
A beneficial side effect of this approach is that our CMS
is also suitable to manage configurations for infrastructure
shared across different organizations which only share a limited
amount of trust.
Structure: Background and related work are explained in
Section II. We define requirements in Sect. III. The design
of the CMS is explained in Sect. IV and an outlook on the
ongoing implementation is given in Sect. V. Sect. VI discusses
intermediate results before we conclude in Sect. VII.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Configuration Management Systems (CMS)
Literature neither defines the term CMS precisely nor
specifies which features a CMS has exactly. Commonly, anyc© 2018 IEEE
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system that standardizes and facilitates the way how devices
are configured is regarded as a CMS.
A core concept of a CMS is to describe configurations
in a serialized, structured representation that can be applied
automatically to devices using an appropriate tool [5, Sect. 2].
This concept is known as Infrastructure as Code (IaC) [6] and
its most simple instantiation would be a configuration shell
script. However, in recent years, more elaborate toolsets were
created. Examples include Chef, Puppet and Ansible [7], which
denotes a serialized configuration as a playbook.
Besides expressing and applying configurations, a CMS
can have further tasks like enforcing a workflow that, for
instance, includes reviewing configurations [5, Sect. 2.3.6]. For
this reason, a CMS can be seen as an intermediary between
administrators and managed devices. However, most CMSs are
lacking workflow enforcement today [5, Sect. 3.3.6].
B. Blockchain-Based Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT)
A distributed ledger is “a type of database that is spread
across multiple sites”. “Records are stored one after the other
in a continuous ledger” and “can only be added when the
participants reach a quorum” [8, p. 17]. Resulting properties
are non-modifiability and non-erasability of data and that
participants of the ledger are not required to fully trust each
other. One example of distributed ledger implementations are
blockchains. Use cases for DLT include, for instance, the
Bitcoin payment system, whose ledger is public, but also
enterprise applications, whose ledgers are typically private.
Hyperledger Fabric [9], [10] is an enterprise blockchain.
The business logic of an application running on top of the
Fabric network is written in chaincode. Each chaincode is
installed on a set of endorsing peers, together with a dedicated
endorsement policy that specifies which peers have to endorse
any transaction on the chaincode. A transaction creates or
modifies a data record stored in the ledger, which consists
of a blockchain and a state database. To modify the ledger,
a client invokes some operation of the chaincode by sending
a transaction proposal to the endorsing peers that have the
chaincode installed. Each of them executes the operation
without modifying the ledger and returns the signed execution
result in the form of an endorsement to the client. If all results
match, the client will send the transaction together with the
set of endorsements to the ordering service, a composite of
several independent nodes that gathers transactions from all
clients and eventually puts them into a block that is delivered
to all peers in the network. Each peer receiving the block, now
in the role of a committing peer, appends the whole block
to its blockchain copy. Afterwards, it checks the validity of
each transaction in the block, i.e., if the endorsement policy is
fulfilled and the execution results of the different peers match.
If this holds, the peer will apply the transaction’s execution
result to its copy of the state database.
III. REQUIREMENTS
This section defines essential requirements on our CMS.
R1 – Multi-party authorization: Critical configurations
must be reviewed and authorized by multiple experts.
R2 – Accountability and traceability: The CMS must log
all steps of the configuration management process to provide
the means to understand who configured what in which way.
R3 – Tamper-resistance: The CMS must be resistant
against attacks that even abuse administrative rights. This
includes protected execution of the configuration management
process and non-erasable and non-forgeable storage of config-
uration data.
IV. DESIGN
This section provides an overview of our system and
showcases how functional components interact.
A. Approach
Our approach is based on the idea to manage configuration
requests (CR) in a configuration management system (CMS). A
CR is a request targeted to one or several managed devices to
apply the configuration included in the CR. As a configuration,
we understand any serialized representation of a system state
of a managed device. In contrast to many existing CMSs, our
system never applies a CR directly to a target device. Instead,
a CR must undergo a validation process before it is applied.
We furthermore assume that remote shell access is disabled
on devices and that a configuration daemon, a trustworthy and
automated application, runs on devices which guarantees that
configurations are applied once they are validated.
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Figure 1. System architecture and interactions between stakeholders
A CR is a composite data structure consisting of a proposal,
a set of approvals and a set of acknowledgements. The proposal
includes the actual configuration and the set of target devices.
The approvals indicate who has approved the CR, while the
acknowledgements indicate which devices have applied it. In
order to guarantee authenticity, authorization and accountability,
proposal, approvals and acknowledgements must be digitally
signed by the corresponding actor. Furthermore, each CR has
a life cycle, represented by the states proposed, valid and
acknowledged. The current state is directly stored in the CR
and updated by the CMS.
A CR starts its life in the proposed state. An administrator,
acting here in the role of a proposer, proposes the desired
configuration together with the set of target devices to the
CMS, c.f. step 1 in figure 1.
The CMS first checks the permissions of the proposer
according to the access control policy (ACP). After the access
has been granted, a CR is created and stored in the CMS,
making it accessible for the subsequent validation process.
To reflect a device’s criticality, this process can be more or
less complex. This means that a CR for highly critical devices
must undergo a more thorough validation to reach the valid
state than a CR for less critical devices. The individual tests
and other conditions of the validation process are specified in
the corresponding validity policy (VP) stored in the CMS.
The individual tests are performed by entities we call
approvers. Approvers can either be computer programs running
on dedicated machines or human experts, e.g. other system
administrators. Tests may include simple syntax checks which
can automatically be performed by programs or security audits
performed by human experts. In order to minimize the risk
of individual fraudulent approvers or mistakes, the VP can
stipulate that tests need to be repeated by n approvers. In case
test results differ from another, a majority vote or other rules,
like m out of n approvals, can be applied.
As a next step, an approver has to retrieve the desired CR,
c.f. step 2. After having performed a test successfully, she
approves the CR, c.f. step 3. This may include a reference
into the VP to express which test has been performed together
with the test result. Once the CMS has received the approver’s
submission, a new approval is appended to the CR.
By time, approvers conduct more and more tests stipulated
by the VP, which results in numerous approvals stored as part
of the respective CR. As soon as the VP is fulfilled for a CR,
the CMS updates the CR’s state to valid. If a device notices
a new valid CR targeted to itself, it retrieves this CR and
automatically applies the configuration, c.f. step 4 and 5.
After having successfully applied the configuration, the
device acknowledges the respective CR, c.f. step 6. As soon as
every target device of the CR has applied and acknowledged
the configuration, the CR reaches the acknowledged state.
B. 3-Tier Architecture
Our design follows the 3-tier architectural pattern, c.f.
figure 2. The topmost presentation tier serves as a user interface.
The logic tier provides the business logic of our CMS and
offers an API with operations to propose or approve a CR, but
also to retrieve or acknowledge one, as described in Sect. IV-A.
The data tier serves as the interface to the used data storage.
It offers write and read operations to the logic tier.
V. IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPT
This section provides an outlook on the ongoing implemen-
tation of our CMS. The presentation tier is implemented as
a command line interface (CLI) and runs on the client. The
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Figure 2. 3-tier architecture
essential role in our implementation, however, is played by
Hyperledger Fabric, c.f. Sect. II-B. The logic as well as the
data tier run in a Fabric network, composed of a set of peers
and an ordering service. The whole business logic described in
Sect. IV-A is executed as chaincode on these peers. The data tier
corresponds to the ledger managed by the peers, consisting of
the blockchain and the state database. Consequently, we utilize
Hyperledger Fabric in two ways: as a distributed execution
environment and as a distributed storage.
The sequence diagram in figure 3 shows how the differ-
ent tiers work together in our implementation. To run our
application, one has to set up and start a Fabric network first.
The chaincodes that handle the business logic have to be
installed on the endorsing peers. Our implementation includes
two chaincodes: the management chaincode (MGTCC) used
to propose, approve, retrieve and acknowledge a
CR, and the policy evaluation chaincode (PECC) used for
evaluating if a CR fulfills an ACP and a VP, respectively. The
endorsement policies for the chaincodes depend on the use case:
If, for instance, the system manages CRs for devices shared
across different organizations, the endorsement policies may
specify that a transaction has to be endorsed by peers of each
organization in order to prevent the peers of one organization
from acting maliciously.
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Figure 3. Message flow through tiers
A proposer proposes a CR via the CLI, c.f. step 1 in figure 3.
The command’s arguments are the target devices and the
configuration data itself, the latter in the form of an Ansible
playbook, c.f. Sect. II-A. The CLI interprets the command and
calls the logic tier by invoking the propose operation of the
MGTCC (1.1). The MGTCC first checks if the proposer is
permitted to propose a CR for the specified devices according
to the corresponding ACP. For this, it calls the evaluateACP
operation of the PECC (1.2). If the PECC returns a positive
result, a new CR will be created and put into the ledger (1.3).
The chaincode invocation in step 1.1 leads to a transaction
flow in the Fabric network that is not shown in the figure, but
has been described in Sect. II-B. Here, the proposer serves as
the client and sends a transaction proposal to the endorsing
peers, which will execute the propose operation and return
their respective endorsement to the client. Afterwards, the
client sends the transaction together with the endorsements to
the ordering service, which will eventually broadcast a new
block to all peers of the network to be appended to their
blockchain copies. The peers check the transaction’s validity
and, if fulfilled, finally write the CR contained in the transaction
to their copy of the state database. Subsequently, the proposer
is notified that the CR has been successfully proposed.
After the approvers have noticed a proposed CR, either by
manually retrieving it from the system (2) or by getting notified
dynamically, they review the CR. If one of them agrees to the
configuration, she will call the CLI to approve the CR (3). The
CLI again interprets the command and hands it over to the logic
tier to invoke the approve operation of the MGTCC (3.1).
The MGTCC adds the new approval to the set of approvals
contained in the CR. Then, it calls the evaluateVP operation of
the PECC to check if the CR is already valid according to the
corresponding VP (3.2). If the PECC returns a positive result,
the MGTCC will change the CR’s status to valid. Then, it puts
the modified CR into the ledger (3.3). The transaction flow in
the Fabric network is analogous to that in step 1.1. Eventually,
the approver will be notified that the approval succeeded.
The configuration daemon running on a device retrieves all
valid CRs targeted to it (4). Since retrieving a CR does not
modify it, it is sufficient in step 4.1 to perform a query using
the retrieve operation of the MGTCC that actually gets the
CR from the ledger (4.2). This time, the transaction flow just
involves multiple endorsing peers which execute the operation
and return the signed results to the daemon, which verifies if
all results are identical.
After having successfully retrieved a valid CR, the config-
uration daemon applies the configuration locally (5) without
having to re-validate the CR as the valid state cannot be forged.
In particular, the playbook stored in the CR is now run using
Ansible. In the end, the configuration daemon acknowledges
the CR (6), followed by the call of the logic tier (6.1).
The acknowledge operation of the MGTCC adds a new
acknowledgement to the CR’s set of acknowledgements.
After each of the target devices has acknowledged the CR,
the MGTCC changes the CR’s state to acknowledged. Then, it
puts the modified CR into the ledger (6.2).
VI. DISCUSSION
As this paper describes work in progress, we have not yet
conducted a full evaluation. However, we want to discuss and
compare our status quo with requirements defined in Sect. III.
Our CMS fulfills the concept of multi-party authorization
(MPA) by requiring the agreement of multiple experts on a
configuration contained in a CR, corresponding to R1.
The whole business logic is executed as chaincode in a
Fabric network. Therefore, we leverage a Fabric network as a
distributed execution environment and as a distributed storage,
providing accountability, traceability and tamper-resistance for
all operations of the CMS, corresponding to R2 and R3.
The peer-to-peer structure of the network even allows
to manage CRs for infrastructure shared across competing
organizations that do not fully trust each other. Each stakeholder
can easily contribute its own nodes to the network and prevent
other stakeholders from acting maliciously, e.g. by manipulating
the result of a chaincode invocation.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we argued that uncontrolled administrative
access rights can pose a serious threat to the security of
IoT systems or other networked systems. We proposed a
configuration management system (CMS) that acts as an
intermediate authority between administrators and managed
devices. The CMS is able to conduct multi-party authorization
(MPA) to achieve Byzantine fault tolerance against hazardous or
faulty configurations. To guarantee accountability, traceability
and tamper-resistance, we employ Hyperledger Fabric as a
distributed execution environment and as a distributed storage
for the whole system and its data objects. Furthermore, our
CMS is suitable to manage configurations for infrastructure
shared across different organizations that do not need to fully
trust each other. Future work includes, among others, finalizing
and carefully evaluating the prototype implementation and
examining how situations that require rapid responses can be
handled in our CMS.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors want to thank Hendrik Leppelsack, Marcel von
Maltitz and Miguel Pardal for valuable input on the paper. Our
work has been supported by the German Federal Ministry of
Education and Research (grant 01LY1217C, project DecADe).
REFERENCES
[1] H. Kinkelin, V. Hauner, H. Niedermayer, and G. Carle, “Trustworthy
Configuration Management for Networked Devices using Distributed
Ledgers,” in NOMS 2018 - IEEE/IFIP DOMINOS Workshop, Apr. 2018.
[2] International Telecommunication Union, “The Internet of Things,”
2005, [Online] https://www.itu.int/net/wsis/tunis/newsroom/stats/
The-Internet-of-Things-2005.pdf, last accessed on May 9, 2018.
[3] Symantec Corporation, “Internet Security Threat Report,” 2016,
[Online] https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/reports/
istr-21-2016-en.pdf, last accessed on May 9, 2018.
[4] Google Inc., “Google Infrastructure Security Design Overview,” 2017,
[Online] https://cloud.google.com/security/security-design/, last accessed
on May 9, 2018.
[5] T. Delaet, W. Joosen, and B. Vanbrabant, “A Survey of System
Configuration Tools,” in Proceedings of the 24th International Conference
on Large Installation System Administration, ser. LISA’10. Berkeley,
CA, USA: USENIX Association, 2010, pp. 1–8.
[6] K. Morris, Infrastructure as Code: Managing Servers in the Cloud.
O’Reilly Media, 2016.
[7] Ansible Inc. / Red Hat Inc., “Ansible,” 2017, [Online] https://www.
ansible.com/, last accessed on May 9, 2018.
[8] The UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser, “Distributed Ledger
Technology: Beyond Blockchain,” 2008, [Online] https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/distributed-ledger-technology-blackett-review/,
last accessed on May 9, 2018.
[9] The Linux Foundation, “Hyperledger Fabric,” 2017, [Online] https://
hyperledger.org/projects/fabric/, last accessed on May 9, 2018.
[10] ——, “Welcome to Hyperledger Fabric - hyperledger-fabricdocs master
documentation,” 2017, [Online] https://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs.io/
en/latest/, last accessed on May 9, 2018.
